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 Cross-border effects of CO2 policies were investigated with an agent-based model.
 The current EU ETS might cause CO2 price shocks and CO2 price volatility.
 A CO2 auction reserve price does not lower welfare, but lowers CO2 price volatility.
 A national CO2 price ﬂoor lowers consumer cost in the other countries.
 A CO2 price ceiling does not lead to an overshoot of emissions.
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 5 December 2013
Received in revised form
19 March 2014
Accepted 25 March 2014
Available online 5 May 2014
Keywords:
EU-ETS
CO2 price caps
Agent-based modelling
a b s t r a c t
The recent low CO2 prices in the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) have triggered a
discussion whether the EU ETS needs to be adjusted. We study the effects of CO2 price ﬂoors and a price
ceiling on the dynamic investment pathway of two interlinked electricity markets (loosely based on
Great Britain, which already has introduced a price ﬂoor, and on Central Western Europe). Using an
agent-based electricity market simulation with endogenous investment and a CO2 market (including
banking), we analyse the cross-border effects of national policies as well as system-wide policy options.
A common, moderate CO2 auction reserve price results in a more continuous decarbonisation
pathway. This reduces CO2 price volatility and the occurrence of carbon shortage price periods, as well as
the average cost to consumers. A price ceiling can shield consumers from extreme price shocks. These
price restrictions do not cause a large risk of an overall emissions overshoot in the long run. A national
price ﬂoor lowers the cost to consumers in the other zone; the larger the zone with the price ﬂoor,
the stronger the effect. Price ﬂoors that are too high lead to inefﬁciencies in investment choices and to
higher consumer costs.
& 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation
The current low CO2 prices in Europe's Emission Trading
System (ETS) have triggered a discussion about policy options
for improving the incentive for investing in CO2 abatement. We
introduce an agent-based electricity market model of two inter-
linked electricity markets which we use to test price ﬂoors
and ceilings which are among these options.1 Concerns are that
the current low permit prices allow high-carbon investments,
which would lock in a considerable part of future CO2 emissions.
This could lead to dynamic inefﬁciencies (Fankhauser and Hepburn,
2010), when later abatement efforts are more challenging than
anticipated, making it more expensive to meet the emission target
in the future. In addition, some policy makers fear the possibility of
high price volatility, since it increases the risk premium of investors
and may deter investment in the capital-intensive low-carbon
technologies altogether (Department of Energy & Climate Change,
2011).
Several implementations of price caps for emission trading
schemes have been discussed as possible measures to increase the
dynamic efﬁciency and decrease price volatility of carbon markets
(Fankhauser and Hepburn, 2010). A price ceiling allows unlimited
emissions at a ﬁxed maximum price. While emissions may thus
exceed the targeted emission level, it serves as a “safety valve”
against CO2 prices high enough to cause substantial consumer
resistance as well as possibly a loss of industrial competitiveness
in comparison to countries which have no, or a lower CO2 price.
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1 Others are reducing the supply of credits, changing to a CO2 tax or introducing
a stability reserve.
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A price ﬂoor prevents low CO2 prices, or at least limits the supply
of permits (in the case of a reserve price) when the CO2 price falls
too low, thus providing a stable minimum incentive for low-
carbon investments (Wood and Jotzo, 2011).
A national price ﬂoor has been introduced in the U.K.
Department of Energy & Climate Change (2011) as a national
policy measure to promote low carbon investments. This, however,
poses new questions regarding cross-border effects of such a
policy, both on the carbon market and on the generation portfolio.
While the direct effects of different national and pan-national CO2
price ﬂoors have been elaborated on byWood and Jotzo (2011), the
feedback loops between the carbon market and investment in
electricity generation still need more research (cf. Section 1.2).
Our agent-based electricity market model EMLab-Generation2
of two interlinked zones (Great Britain and Central Western
Europe) provides a dynamic simulation of investment in genera-
tion capacity in response to CO2 price ﬂoors and caps that are
implemented in Great Britain, CWE or in the entire system. With
Monte-Carlo simulations and sensitivity analysis, we analyse the
robustness of different CO2 price cap policies in the presence of
external inﬂuences such as uncertain demand development and
fuel prices. We analyse the impacts on CO2 emissions, price
levels and price volatility, as well as on total generation costs
and consumer expenditures.
We ﬁnd that moderate price ﬂoors signiﬁcantly reduce CO2
price volatility and prevent the occurrence of scarcity price
periods, while they do not increase overall electricity generation
costs. An additional price ceiling effectively protects consumers
against the risk of price spikes. The effect of national implementa-
tions of CO2 price ﬂoors depends strongly on the relative size of
the introducing area as compared to the total market size.
In the following we will discuss the relevant existing literature
and choice of modelling methodology (Section 1.2), introduce our
model in Section 2, discuss and analyse the results (Section 3),
discuss them in light of the model's assumptions and limitations in
Section 3.7 and come to our conclusions and policy recommenda-
tions in Section 4.
1.2. Literature review and choice of methodology
In the academic debate, price caps lie between a pure price based
mechanism, the Pigovian tax, which puts a price to a negative
externality, and quantity-based mechanisms, which can be traced
back to Coase (1960), which limit emissions by setting a cap and
making them tradable via permits.3 Price caps thus constitute hybrid
instruments, which were ﬁrst proposed by Roberts and Spence (1976),
who state that in case of non-linear marginal damages, as well as
uncertainty about marginal costs to prevent these damages, hybrid
instruments are superior, since they allow for a closer approximation
of the expected damage function for pollution.
For models of the overall economy price ceilings have been
discussed widely for climate mitigation schemes4 (e.g. Pizer, 2002;
Jacoby and Ellerman, 2004). They come to the conclusion that
price ceilings can lead to large welfare beneﬁts. The discussion of
price ﬂoors in carbon markets is more recent (Wood and Jotzo,
2011; Burtraw et al., 2010). Wood and Jotzo (2011) state that in
principle three models for CO2 price ﬂoors exist: A buy back of
licenses by the administrator (as proposed in Hepburn, 2006), a
reserve price when emissions are auctioned (Grubb and Neuhoff,
2006; Hepburn et al., 2006), and a complementary tax paid by the
emitter, where the sum of the EU ETS price and the complemen-
tary tax is equal to the desired minimum CO2 price ﬂoor, whenever
the EU ETS permit price is below the price ﬂoor. Wood and Jotzo
(2011) conclude that the ﬁrst and the second options are not
applicable for national solutions within interlinked CO2 trading
systems (e.g. within the EU ETS), since the ﬁrst creates potentially
unlimited liabilities and the latter might lead to emitters buying
permits elsewhere, thus reducing the introducing state's source of
income. The third option described by Wood and Jotzo, a com-
plementary tax for energy producers was introduced in Great
Britain.5
Regarding analysis discussing the effect of price ﬂoors and
ceilings in the electricity sector, these have mostly been conducted
from a single investor perspective (Szolgayova et al., 2008;
Brauneis et al., 2013), using real options analysis. Burtraw et al.
(2010) are an exception and use an equilibrium simulation model
to analyse the effects of symmetric price caps, and ﬁnding them to
be welfare enhancing. However, up to now no fully dynamic
simulation model has to our knowledge been utilised to analyse
price caps, especially not for national implementations. However,
such dynamic investigations are useful, since equilibrium models
often assume that systems develop into the future on a cost-
optimal trajectory, but as Olsina et al. (2006) point out this can
hardly be assumed, since important preconditions are not met:
Production capacity for example can, as in any capital-intensive
infrastructure system, only slowly be adjusted, which easily leads
to business cycles. Furthermore long-run uncertainties exist, and
thus perfect information and foresight should not be assumed.
Thus path dependencies exist in the electricity sector, a problem
that seems especially relevant to model when looking into
the current debate about a EU ETS with very low prices, and the
discussion whether this leads to lock-in effects into carbon inten-
sive electricity production.
We decided to analyse national and pan-national, symmetric
and asymmetric price caps with the help of an agent-based model,
which is a middle way between fully ﬂexible linguistic models
and fully formalised, yet simpliﬁed analytic models (Holland
and Miller, 1991). Agent-based modelling has been argued to be
especially well suited to investigate out-of-the-equilibrium eco-
nomics, the process of equilibrium formation and the inclusion
of historical path dependencies (Arthur, 2006), which applied
to generation capacity expansion models translates to the fact
that earlier changes in generation capacity can strongly alter the
outcome in later years. While agent-based modelling is more
common for spot-market simulations of electricity markets and
attached CO2 markets (see for example Weidlich and Veit, 2008 or
Guerci et al., 2010 for an overview), agent-based modelling is only
being applied more recently to long-term policy issues, such as
market concentration (Botterud et al., 2007), CO2 cap and trade
systems and CO2 taxes (Chappin, 2011; Chappin and Dijkema,
2009), and to compare different CO2 emission allocation schemes
(Mos̈t et al., 2011).
2. Model description and assumptions
We use an agent-based model to simulate the impact of
different carbon policies on a hypothetical electricity sector that
consists of two interconnected zones, based on Great Britain
(GB) and Central Western Europe (CWE, consisting of Belgium,
Germany, France, Luxembourg and The Netherlands). The capacity
of the interconnector is allocated through market coupling.2 Part of the EMLab suite of energy models, http://emlab.tudelft.nl.
3 The advantages of prices versus quantities and vice versa were given by
Weitzman (1974).
4 See Fankhauser and Hepburn (2010) for a comprehensive overview of other
ETS design options.
5 Northern Island is excluded due to fears of loss of competitiveness of
generators due to the large interconnection with Ireland.
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In addition to the EU ETS (the European CO2 cap-and-trade
scheme, which is implemented as one single trading period with
banking), our model includes the options to implement separate
carbon price caps and ﬂoors in each zone, where the lower of the
two price ﬂoors or a common price ﬂoor is treated as a CO2 auction
reserve price. The model is an extension of the long-term agent-
based model EMLab-Generation, which makes use of the Agent-
Spring modelling framework (Chmieliauskas et al., 2012) and prior
work in (Chappin, 2011; de Vries et al., 2013).
The main agents in our model are electricity generation companies.
They make decisions regarding short-term bidding and the procure-
ment of fuels and CO2 as well as about investment. They are driven by
a proﬁt motive. The generation companies interact with each other
and with other agents in markets, and so affect their own state (e.g.
cash position) and their direct surroundings (foremost among them
the power plants, which are implemented as discrete objects with
their own states). These and the behaviour of other agents (such as
fuel suppliers and electricity spot markets), are described algorithmi-
cally and implemented in Java. The source code and input data used to
run this model are openly accessible.6 In order to facilitate Monte-
Carlo simulations, several simplifying assumptions needed to be made
to keep the model computationally feasible.
2.1. General model structure and agents
The model's time step is one year. Each year, the generation
companies determine the fuel mix of their power plants (if multiple
fuels are available), buy fuels, determine their bids for the power
exchange and, after the market is cleared, they dispatch their genera-
tion units. They receive revenues from the power exchange market
and pay any applicable policy costs (such as for carbon credits).
As the agents decide about investing in and decommissioning
plant, the evolution of the power plant mix is an emergent result
of the individual agents' investment decisions in each annual time
step. In their investment decisions, they take into consideration
the expected electricity prices and CO2 prices, which the agents
derive by comparing estimations of the merit order and demand,
and expected fuel prices, which they estimate from past observed
data (cf. Section 2.5). The fact that the agents' knowledge of the
future is limited is an important characteristic of the model. It
leads to sub-optimal decisions, which corresponds to reality in
that expectations often differ from outcomes.7
In the following, the most relevant parts of the model are
described. A more extensive description of the model is given by
de Vries et al. (2013).
2.2. Power plant operation and spot market bidding
An initial fuel mix of multi-fuel power plants is determined at
the beginning of each year using linear optimisation, based on the
CO2 prices in the previous year. However, if the CO2 price changes
during the combined electricity and CO2 market clearing itera-
tions, the fuel mix of the power plants is updated, so that
electricity and CO2 markets are in short-term equilibrium (cf.
Section 2.3). This is done with a linear program that uses current
fuel prices (which are known), the CO2 price, power plant
efﬁciencies and the fuel mix constraints given in Table A1. The
resulting variable fuel costs vcg;t per MWhel for power plant g in
time step t are then determined as the product of the volumes of
the fuels (f) in fuel mix sg;f ;t and the fuel prices pf ;t:
vcg;t ¼∑
f
pf ;t  sg;f ;t
ηg
ð1Þ
We assume that variable power plant costs are solely determined
by their fuel costs and that the market price includes a 10% mark-
up m on variable costs. (This implies the presence of a certain
amount of market power. Modelling market power is beyond the
scope of this model, but this markup appears to be a reasonable
assumption, cf. Eager et al., 2012.) Therefore the bidding price
pz;s;g;t (cf. (3)) for all agents is deﬁned as
pz;s;g;t ¼ vcg;t  ð1þmÞ ð2Þ
2.3. Interlinked electricity and CO2 markets
The electricity spot market is abstracted from an hourly power
system model by representing demand in each zone as a step-wise
approximation of the load duration curve. The load-duration curve
has 20 segments (s) from base to peak load, with each segment
having a ﬁxed demand in each zone. Thus the hours in the year with
a similar demand in both countries are grouped together in one
segment (see Fig. 1). The duration of each segment can be varied in
order to achieve a good approximation of the load duration curve.
While this abstraction has its disadvantages,8 it allows for signiﬁ-
cantly shorter model run times and thus enables us to make several
hundred Monte-Carlo runs of the entire model in an acceptable
amount of time. Interlinked with the electricity market is the CO2
market including banking. It is implemented by an algorithm that
ﬁnds a CO2 price bringing the current electricity market and its
emissions in equilibrium with forecasted CO2 emissions, while
abiding to the cap and the CO2 hedging needs of power producers.
This is achieved by simultaneously clearing the current electricity
market and a forecasted electricity market in three years under a
joint emission cap and a joint CO2 price (which is compounded to the
future). Thus emissions are banked at current time, if the com-
pounded CO2 price is expected to lead to an exceeding of the cap by
the banked amount in the future time period (and vice versa).
Fig. 1. Load duration curves of CWE and GB and their approximations.
6 See the electronic appendix or https://github.com/EMLab/emlab-generation/
tree/paper/co2PriceCaps.
7 Agents are adaptable in a limited sense in that they remember past prices and
perform a regression for estimating future prices. However, no more complicated
learning techniques (such as reinforcement learning) are used in the model, since
they require frequent repetition of behaviour. Since investment decisions occur
rarely and are only made once under the same sort of condition, reinforcement
learning methods do not appear to apply, as Banal-Estanol and Rupérez-Micola
(2010) point out.
8 By removing the temporal order between different hours of the year,
technical constraints, such as start- and shutdown decisions, as well as power
plant ramping constraints cannot be adequately represented in the model.
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In addition to that producers aim to hold around 1.5 years of their
forecasted CO2 emissions. The banking target and the hedging
horizon of three years were chosen based on empirical data
of hedging needs of European power producers, who hedge CO2
permits according to their future power sales and, due to risk
management procedures, rarely hedge further ahead than three
years (Eurelectric, 2009; Neuhoff et al., 2012). Our banking model
is inﬂuenced by two works: Schopp and Neuhoff (2013) present a
partial-equilibriummodel that explicitly jointly optimises CO2 permit
hedging and future power sales. Fagiani et al. (2014) use a funda-
mental price approach in a dynamic model, which; however, does
not bring current banking and future price expectations into con-
gruence. In our model the iterative market clearing process consists
of the following steps, which are in part depicted in Fig. 2.
(1) Each generation company submits its electricity bids, one
price-volume pair per power plant g for each segment s of
the load-duration function according to Section 2.2. This also
includes updating the fuel mix according to the CO2 price of the
current iteration. They only bid into the electricity market in
which their power plant is located (zone z).
bz;s;g;t ¼ ðpz;s;g;t ;Vz;s;g;tÞ ð3Þ
(2) The bids of the generation companies are adjusted for the CO2
price pCO2 ;t and, if applicable, the complementary CO2 tax TCO2 ;z;t
(taking the emission intensity eg,t of the power plant into account).
bCO2z;s;g;t ¼ ðpCO2z;s;g;t ;Vz;s;g;tÞ ¼ ðpz;s;g;tþðpCO2 ;tþTCO2 ;z;tÞ  eg;t ;Vz;s;g;tÞ ð4Þ
If a complementary tax is implemented, it is set to create a CO2
price ﬂoor FCO2 ;z;t in zone z:
TCO2 ;z;t ¼maxð0; FCO2 ;z;tpCO2 ;tÞ ð5Þ
(3) The two electricity markets, which are physically coupled
by an interconnector with a ﬁxed capacity IC of 3 GW,9 are
then cleared together (via market coupling) and the highest
accepted bid bCO2 ;nz;s;g;t ¼ ðpCO2 ;nz;s;g;t ;Vnz;s;g;tÞ sets the market clearing
price pCO2 ;nz;s;g;t in each zone z for each segment s of the load-
duration function. In case demand Dz;s;t in segment s cannot be
satisﬁed, the clearing price is set to the value of lost load.
(4) The step described above is carried out for an electricity
market forecast in three years (taking into account power
plants under construction and dismantlement), except that
the CO2 price, used to clear the market, is compounded to
p^CO2 ;tþ3 ¼ pCO2 ;t  ð1þ iBÞ3. The discount rate iB is set to 5%, which
lies in the reported range of interviews done by Neuhoff et al.
(2012). As input data for the electricity market forecast, fuel
price and demand trend forecasts for three years ahead are
calculated. The applied regression methodology is described in
Section 2.5. The past 5 years are used as input data for the
regression.
(5) The market results lead to a certain (optimal) generation unit
commitment, from which the resulting CO2 emissions of the
current market and the market forecast are determined.
Et ¼ ∑
z;s;g
Vz;s;g;t  eg;t
E^ tþ3 ¼ ∑
z;s;g
V^ z;s;g;tþ3  eg;tþ3 ð6Þ
(6) The clearing emission cap is given by the sum of the emission
cap CCO2 ;t of the current year, by the emission cap in three years
time CCO2 ;tþ3 and the difference to the banking target divided
by a revision speed factor ΔTB;t=r. The banking target is
determined by assuming that producers aim to hedge 80%
of expected emissions in the coming, 50% in two and 20% in
three years time. The expected emissions of Etþ1 and Etþ2 are
determined by linear interpolation between Et and Etþ3. This
banking rule is based on a study done by Eurelectric (2009) and
an interview series by Neuhoff et al. (2012). To allow some
ﬂexibility in returning to the banking target a revision speed
factor r of r¼3 is used.
If the CO2 emissions exceed the clearing emissions cap, the CO2
price pCO2 ;t is raised, and vice versa if the emissions are below
the cap, and steps (2) through (5) are repeated. The iteration
stops and the market is considered to be cleared when the
emissions are approximately equal to the CO2 cap, when a price
minimum (0 or global price ﬂoor) or price ceiling CCO2 ;t is
reached. In scenarios without a price ceiling, a constant max-
imum price of €500/ton is assumed.10 Alternatively if the
maximum number of iterations is reached, the last value of
pCO2 ;t is used. We apply a tolerance band of 73% in order to
ﬁnish the iteration in a timely fashion.
(7) Depending on whether the clearing emission cap is approxi-
mately reached, or if the lower of the national (or a common)
price ﬂoor is sufﬁcient to lead to emissions below the cap, the
banked allowances are adjusted. In case the cap is approxi-
mately reached, the sum of banked allowances by all agents
is adjusted by the difference between the emission cap
of the current year and the emissions in the current year
(ΔBt ¼ CCO2 ;tEt). In case that the lower of the two emission
ﬂoors is sufﬁcient to lead to sub-cap emissions, the difference
to the overall banked emissions is given by the difference to the
banking target divided by the revision speed factor ΔTB;t=r.
Thus, the lower of the price ﬂoors (or a common price ﬂoor) is
simulated as a reserve price at which agents buy or sell11 their
credits to reach their hedging target. If more permits would be
consumed than are banked, the target search algorithm is run
for only the current period. The banked permits are assigned to
agents according to their share in overall emissions. The
difference to the previous years banked credits affects their
cash position at the current year's permit prices. The agents
start the simulation with 500 million CO2 certiﬁcates already
Fig. 2. Stylised electricity and CO2 market clearing process.
9 This corresponds to the current interconnection between GB and CWE. Larger
values have not been investigated. See Section 3.7 for a discussion of this
assumption.
10 At that point the last fuel switching alternatives under most price scenarios
are exhausted.
11 Assuming that the reduction in banked allowances is not so large that it will
depress secondary market prices below the reserve price.
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banked, which is at the upper limit of the estimation by
Neuhoff et al. (2012).
2.4. Generation technologies and initial portfolio
Fifteen power generation technologies are implemented in the
model (see Table A1). Investment costs, maintenance costs, opera-
tional costs, fuel efﬁciencies and technological learning (affecting
fuel efﬁciencies and investment costs) are modelled after the
IEA World Energy Outlook 2011 New Policies Scenario (IEA,
2011). Additional assumptions were made regarding power plant
capacities, their technical life spans, CO2 capture efﬁciency, depre-
ciation times and co-ﬁring (see A1). Due to the approximation of
the load duration curve, model-speciﬁc assumptions needed to be
made for some technologies. Minimum running hours serve as an
investment decision approximation for plants with longer ramp-
ing times. The intermittency of renewable power plants is deter-
ministically reﬂected in their availability during base and peak
hours, i.e. a wind turbine only produces 5% of its nameplate
capacity during peaks, whereas hydro power plants contribute
more (60% of name plate capacity) to peak hours than to base
hours (0%). The low contribution of wind to the peak is based on
German empirical data. In between the base and peak segments,
the segment-dependent availability ag;s is varied linearly. These
assumptions are summarised in Table A1. The initial generation
portfolios are modelled after the generation mix of CWE and GB in
2011 (data taken from Eurelectric, 2012), and the age structure of
the power plants is modelled after the average age structure of
power plants in the European Union (RWE, 2008). Since market
power is not endogenously modelled, for simplicity an assumption
was made with regard to the initial ownership and number of
agents per zone: all technologies are evenly distributed between
the 4 generation companies of each zone. Finally, for computa-
tional reasons, all capacities of power plants in the CWE zone are
scaled by a factor of 4, as compared to Table A1.
2.5. Investment in generation capacity
Each generation company invests in only one zone, so market
entry into the other zone is not considered. Investment decisions
by generators are made in an iterative process in which the
companies sequentially consider investing. A company's invest-
ment decision inﬂuences the decisions of the following companies.
The investment process is stopped as soon as none of the
companies invest any more. To prevent a continuous bias towards
speciﬁc generation companies, the order in which they invest is
determined randomly each year. Agents are assumed to ﬁnance
30% of the capital cost of a power plant from their cash ﬂow
(expecting a 12% return on equity), and pay this amount as down
payments in equal instalments during the construction period of
Table 1
Notation.
Variable Unit/Content Description
t a Time step, in years
z {CWE,GB} Zone index
Ss;z ðDs; lsÞ Segment is a tuple of demand and length
Ds;z MW Demand in Segment S
ls h Length of Segment S (identical for both countries)
s f1;…;20g Segment index
LDCz;t fSz;1 ;…; Sz;20g Load duration curve with 20 segments
bz;s;g;t ðpz;s;g;t ;Vz;s;g;t Þ Bid into zone z, segment s, year t for power plant g, excluding CO2 cost
pz;s;g;t €=MWhel Bidded price
Vz;s;g;t ton=MWhel Bidded energy
pnz;s;t €=MWhel Segment clearing price
bCO2z;s;g;t ðpCO2z;s;g;t ;Vz;s;g;t Þ Bid adjusted by the iterative CO2 target search.
g f1;…;Gg Power plant index
eg,t ton=MWhel Emission intensity of power plant g in year t
pCO2 ;t €=ton CO2 permit price
FCO2 ;z;t €=ton CO2 Price ﬂoor in zone z
TCO2 ;z;t €=ton Complementary CO2 tax in zone z
CCO2 ;t €=ton Common price ceiling
Bt ;ΔBt ton Banked emission permits, difference in banked emission permits
iB Interest rate for compounding the CO2 price
TB;t ;ΔTB;t ton CO2 permit banking target, and difference to it in year t
r Revision speed factor towards the banking target
vcg;t €=MWhel Variable fuel costs of power plant g in t
fcg;t € Fixed costs of power plant g in t
pf ;t €=MWhth Price of fuel f in time step t
sg;f ;t MWhth Amount of fuel f in fuel mix of power plant g in time step t
ηg Efﬁciency of power plant g
as;g Segment dependent availability of power plant g
m Price mark-up of generators
r^ g;s;t h Expected running hours of power plan g, in segment s, in year t
Ig,t € Investment cost of power plant g in t
WACC Weighted average cost of capital
Table 2
Fuel price and demand growth rate assumptions.
Type Unit Demand CWE Demand GB Lignite Biomass Uranium
Start €=GJ s.b. s.b. 1.428 4.5 1.286
Average [%] 1.30 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
Upper [%] 5.40 4.00 1.0 7.00 1.00
Lower [%] 3.90 2.00 1.00 5.00 1.00
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the plant. The remaining 70% are assumed to be debt-ﬁnanced at
an interest rate of 9%. The loan is assumed to be paid back in equal
annuities during the depreciation period of the power plant
(cf. Table A1). The agents take the following steps in each round
(Table 1):
(1) The generation companies forecast fuel prices and electri-
city demand in n years time (n varies between 6 and 8 years
for investors, which contributes to heterogeneity in the
investment decisions) by applying a regression analysis,
assuming future fuel prices and electricity demand to
correspond to a linear trend. Similarly, they forecast
CO2 prices by taking the average of a linear regression
forecast and the forecasted CO2 clearing in 3 years time
(cf. Section 2.3). The number of past years that are used for
forecasting vary between 4 and 6 years for the various
agents. This leads to heterogeneous forecasts and therefore
to some heterogeneity in the investment behaviour.
(2) Based on the above assumptions and on the expected life
spans of the existing power plants, a bottom-up estimation
of future electricity prices p^n z;s;t is made for each segment
of the load-duration function by using the merit order of
existing and announced new power plants and excluding
power plants which are expected to be dismantled due
to age.
(3) For each power generation technology type, it is veriﬁed
that the necessary investment conditions, such as sufﬁcient
cash reserves and physical and social limit such as a
maximum investment limit, are met in each zone.12
(4) The expected number of hours r^ s;g;t that a plant is running
are calculated from the estimated future energy prices in
each segment. They are compared to the minimum running
hours of the technology type (Table A1). Based on the
expected running hours and prices, the expected cash ﬂow
during operation CFOp;g is calculated for the reference year
tþn:
CFOp;g ¼ CFg;tþn ¼∑
s
ððp^n z;s;tþn v^cg;tþnÞ  r^ s;g;tþn  ag;sÞ fcg;tþn
ð7Þ
Generation companies compare power plants with different
capacities κg with each other by calculating their speciﬁc
net present values (NPV) per MW over the building period
(0‥tb) and the expected service period (tbþ1…tbþtD). The
weighted average cost of capital (WACC) is used as the
interest rate:
NPVg ¼ ∑
t ¼ 0…tb
 Ig;t
ð1þWACCÞtþ ∑t ¼ tb þ1…tb þ tD
CFOp;g
ð1þWACCÞt
 !
κg

ð8Þ
(5) If any of the NPVs are positive, the technology type g with
the highest speciﬁc NPVg per megawatt is chosen.
2.6. Fuel price and demand trends
Electricity demand and lignite, biomass and uranium prices are
modelled as stochastic trends, using a triangular distribution to
determine the year-on-year growth rate. The assumptions for the
average growth rate and the upper and lower bounds of the
triangular functions are summarised in Table 2.
The costs of biomass are in the range estimated by Faaij (2006)
for northern European biomass, lignite is based on Konstantin
(2009), but inﬂation adjusted. Hard coal and natural gas prices are
modelled as correlated stochastic Ornstein–Uhlenbeck processes.
They are mean reverting to three different fossil fuel scenarios
which we took from the UK Department of Energy and Climate
Change (Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2012) and
extended beyond 2035 (cf. Fig. B1). The variance around these
trend lines was set to a long-term average between 1920 and 1996,
and the mean reversion speed was set to 5 years as calculated by
Pindyck (1999) (cf. Section Appendix B). The correlation between
coal and gas prices was estimated from fuel prices in the UK
between 1993 and 2011 (Department of Energy & Climate Change,
2013).
The load-duration function is based on ENTSO-E data from
2010 for the CWE and the UK. It is assumed that the growth rate of
demand is the same in all segments of the load duration curve.
2.7. Renewable investment
Since European governments are subsidising renewables,
renewable policy is implemented in the simulation by assuming
that the governments in CWE and GB exogenously fulﬁl policy
targets. These are implemented as national renewable target
investors who only invest in renewable energy if private invest-
ment does not reach the government targets.
3. Model results and discussion
Because of the complexity of the model results, we integrate
them with their discussion and analysis. This section starts with a
description of the scenarios that we use in Section 3.1. Next, we
present our model results regarding the effects of the different CO2
policies on CO2 prices and emissions in Section 3.2. In Section 3.3, we
link this to the underlying changes in the generation portfolio and
investment decisions. The impact on generation costs and consumer
expenditures is analysed in Section 3.4. While Sections 3.2–3.4
discuss the model results on an exemplary base case, the analysis
is extended to further fuel prices and renewable scenarios in
Section 3.5. A sensitivity analysis regarding price ﬂoor levels is
discussed in Section 3.6. In Section 3.7 we reﬂect on the results in
light of our assumptions and the model's limitations. All statistical
evaluations and graphs were done in GNU R (R Core Team, 2003).
3.1. Scenarios
We apply a combination of Monte-Carlo simulations and
sensitivity analysis to investigate the dynamic development of
investment decisions, CO2 prices and electricity prices as a func-
tion of CO2 policy choices. We model ﬁve different CO2 policy
options in a base case. For each of these policy scenarios, we vary
Table 3
Investigated CO2 policies.
Policy Price ﬂoor Price ceiling
Country GB CWE Both
PureETS □ □ □
MinGB ■ □ □
MinCWE □ ■ □
BothMin ■ ■ □
BMinMax ■ ■ ■
12 Examples of such conditions are a limit on nuclear energy in CWE, due to
political constraints in Germany and limits to the volume of new capacity that can
be constructed simultaneously, e.g. due to labour force and equipment constraints,
and geographic constraints to hydro power.
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the fuel price development (around the scenario fuel price trends)
and the electricity demand growth rate Monte-Carlo style. 120
Monte-Carlo runs are performed for each of the 5 scenarios. The
same 120 realisations are used for all scenarios to avoid random
differences between the scenario results.
The CO2 policies under investigation are detailed in Table 3. For
the MinGB case the price ﬂoor starts at €18:50=tCO2 and rise with
€2:30=tCO2 per year. This corresponds approximately to the origin-
ally planned price ﬂoor in the GB (Department of Energy &
Climate Change, 2011) which starts at about 16d=tCO2 in 2013
and reaches 30d=tCO2 by 2020 and 70d=tCO2 by 2030.
13 For the
MinCWE, BothMin and BothMinMax cases the price ﬂoor starts at
€7:50=tCO2 and rises with €1=tCO2 per year.
14
The national price ﬂoors are implemented as complementary
taxes and do not (directly) affect the price of the CO2 permits
themselves, but only the total CO2 price that is paid by affected
generation companies.15 We will also refer to this as the effective CO2
price. The complementary carbon tax is deﬁned as the difference
between the CO2 permit price and the desired price ﬂoor, if the CO2
price is below the price ﬂoor (and otherwise it is zero). On the other
Fig. 3. CO2 price and emissions development.
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Fig. 4. Maximum CO2 permit prices in different scenarios.
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Fig. 5. Boxplot of the standard deviation of effective CO2 prices in individual runs.
13 In practice the UK government ﬁxes the complementary tax two years ahead
of its realisation, based on the future carbon price (UK Government HM Revenue &
Customs, 2013). This results in a lower effective minimum price.
14 The reason to choose a lower price ﬂoor for these scenarios is policy
relevance: a price ﬂoor as a high the one in GB seems to be politically unrealistic
for the whole EU ETS.
15 While, strictly speaking, the sum of a price and a tax is not a price, we follow
the nomenclature used by Wood and Jotzo (2011).
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hand the price ﬂoors in the BothMin and BMinMax scenarios are
implemented as a CO2 auction reserve price.
The price ceiling in the BMinMax scenario starts at €60=tCO2
and rises by €2=tCO2 per year. It is implemented as a limit to the
CO2 permit price. If, at this price, demand for CO2 permits is
greater than the cap, additional emission permits are issued, so the
CO2 emissions cap is exceeded. The EU ETS is part of all our policy
options. The emissions cap is calibrated using the 20% reduction
target for 2020 (as compared to 1990 emissions) and an 80%
reduction target for 2050 (compared to 2005 emissions).
In addition to the base case, we model two more renewable
policy options. In the base-case scenario, we assume that the
development of renewable until 2020 to follow the National
Renewable Energy Action Plans (Beurskens et al., 2011) and
between 2020 and 2050 to follow the 80% pathway of Roadmap
2050 by the European Climate Foundation (2010). In addition, we
model a scenario with half this volume of renewable energy and a
scenario without a renewable energy target. Regarding fuel prices,
we use the medium scenario (cf. Section Appendix B) as a base
case scenario, and a higher and a lower scenario for sensitivity
analysis. Finally for all policy scenarios except the PureETS, we
vary the price ﬂoor levels.
3.2. CO2 prices and emissions
In order to show the effects of the different policy options on
CO2 permit prices and on effective CO2 prices, Fig. 3 shows the
development over time of CO2 permit prices and CO2 emissions.
The CO2 permit price is high in years 10–20, with a signiﬁcant
increase of volatility. This is due to an increase in the linear
reduction factor of the CO2 cap and the technical end of life of
legacy nuclear power plants. As can be seen in the emission plot,
agents bank CO2 permits before, which they are using in the
peaking period. After this period, the price drops in all scenarios
and then rises again gradually towards the end of the simulation
period. Emissions ﬂuctuate around the cap, but are slightly above
it, as agents reduce there banked emissions with their hedging
needs.16 MinCWE and BothMin reduce CO2 permit prices, includ-
ing the price peak, and naturally the price ceiling in BMinMax
limits CO2 price peaks.
To provide an indication of the frequency of price peaks, Fig. 4
shows the cumulative distribution of the highest CO2 permit prices
that occur in the individual simulations. For a given CO2 permit
price on the x-axis, the intercept with the curve shows the
percentage of runs in which the highest CO2 price (in the entire
run) is the same or lower. So while 30% of PureETS runs have a
maximum permit price of 110 € /ton or less, the same quantile is
105 €/ton in the MinGB scenario. The frequency of maximum CO2
permit prices is a measure of the likelihood that CO2 permits
become scarce in a given scenario. Fig. 4 shows that the PureETS
and MinGB scenarios are most prone to CO2 price peaks. The risk
of price peaks is reduced by the introduction of a price ﬂoor in
CWE and even more if both zones introduce a price ﬂoor. If we
deﬁne price peaks as periods with prices greater than 150 €/ton
CO2, their duration also correlates with their height. Whereas
there are two or fewer years with high price periods in 65% of the
PureETS and MinGB simulations, this number falls to one year in
the MinCWE scenario and there are no peak years in the BothMin
and, by deﬁnition, the BMinMax scenario.
The overall volatility of effective CO2 prices is, of course, affected
by the occurrence of price peaks. This can be seen in Fig. 5, which
shows a boxplot of the standard deviation of effective CO2 prices in
individual runs.17 This ﬁgure sheds more light on how national CO2
policies affect the volatility in the two zones, as it shows the
volatility in each zone separately (by considering the national CO2
price ﬂoors in addition to the CO2 permit price). While the
introduction of a price ﬂoor in GB reduces volatility slightly in GB
(due to the prevention of a CO2 price collapse in GB), effective CO2
price volatility decreases only slightly in the CWE zone.
Last but not least, we review the degree to which the policy
options achieve the CO2 reduction target. Fig. 6 shows the relative
frequency distribution of total emissions as a percentage of the
emissions cap over the different runs for the investigated policy
options. Emissions are close to the cap in the PureETS, the MinGB
and the MinCWE scenario, which shows that when banking exists,
a national price ﬂoor changes the total emission rate only by a
small amount, even if CWE introduces that price ﬂoor. The
fact that total emissions are slightly over the cap is due to the
initial volume of banked permits. The situation is different in the
BothMin and BMinMax scenarios, in which the minimum price for
CO2 is modelled as a reserve price at the auction. In this case, the
volume of permits that is issued at the auction may drop below
the cap if there is not enough demand at the reserve price, and
therefore over abatement as compared to the cap can occur.
In our scenarios, over abatement only occurs to a relatively
small degree due to the relatively low level of the price ﬂoor.
The differences between runs are mostly caused by the differences
between the stochastic demand scenarios, as the price restric-
tions limit the system's responsiveness to extreme scenarios.
The BMinMax case has slightly higher emissions, as compared to
BothMin, which is caused by the additional CO2 permits issued in
the years when the CO2 price ceiling is reached. An interesting
and perhaps counter-intuitive outcome is that despite these price
restrictions, this emission overshoot is limited. The reason is that
while a price ceiling may allow emissions to exceed the cap
in speciﬁc years, overall the price ﬂoor is high enough to induce
sufﬁcient abatement in the long run.
3.3. Generation portfolio
The differences in emissions and CO2 prices between model
runs are largely caused by different investment decisions. Fig. 7
PureETS MinGB MinCWE
BothMin BMinMax
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
0.90 0.95 1.00 0.90 0.95 1.00
Emitted CO2  as % of total CO2 cap
D
is
tri
bu
tio
n
Fig. 6. Histogram of CO2 emissions.
16 And are thus emitting more than is available under the yearly cap.
17 The standard deviation of prices, not logarithmic returns is used here as a
measure for volatility, since zero prices occur.
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shows the mean development of selected technologies for the
different policy options. The top series of graphs represent the
CWE zone, the bottom series Great Britain. The lines represent
the mean value of the different Monte-Carlo runs for each time
step. The graph shows a selection of generation technologies in
order to highlight the differences between the scenarios. (While
there are considerable variations between the Monte-Carlo runs,
we omitted the quantile envelopes so as to achieve a clearer
representation of the scenario trends.)
Fig. 7 shows that price ﬂoors lead to a more continuous
reduction of carbon intensive technologies such as pulverised coal
(CoalPSC) and a faster build up of low-carbon technologies. This is
especially true for medium term CO2 abatement decisions such as
substitution of coal by gas or nuclear power plants: whereas in the
year 2025, on average, a total of 40.2 GW of CoalPSC, 57.4 GW of
CCGT and 29.2 GW of Nuclear are installed in CWE in the PureETS
scenario, this shifts to 32.4 GW of CoalPSC, 65.4 GW of CCGT and
34.1 GW of nuclear in the BothMin scenario.
Secondly, Fig. 7 conﬁrms our earlier observation that national
price ﬂoors lead to stronger decarbonisation locally, but that
the resulting lower CO2 permit prices lead to more investment
in carbon-intensive technologies in the other zone. This is clearly
Fig. 7. Mean development of nuclear, pulverised coal, integrated gasiﬁcation combined cycle (IGCC), combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) and technologies with carbon
capture and storage (CCS).
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Fig. 8. Boxplot of speciﬁc consumer expenditures in CWE and GB (excluding RES
subsidies).
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visible for CoalPSC for the MinCWE and MinGB policy options.
From year 6 on, less CoalPSC is installed in the zone with the price
ﬂoor, as compared to the PureETS scenario. This is followed by a
prolonged period until year 11 with lower CO2 prices as compared
to the PureETS case (cf. Fig. 3), which in turn lead to more CoalPSC
capacity in the zone without a price ﬂoor by the year 13 of the
simulation, as compared to the PureETS scenario.
3.4. Total generation costs and consumer expenditure
Social welfare is equal to the total utility of electricity minus
the total costs of generation. As the utility is difﬁcult to estimate
and electricity demand is assumed to be price-inelastic and our
model does not include transmission, the goal of maximising
social welfare can be approximated by minimising the discounted
total costs of generation. We deﬁne the total cost of generation as
payments that leave the group of generators, consumers and
governments (who produce electricity via the renewable target
investor). Therefore it is comprised by payments to power plant
manufacturers, fuel suppliers and interest payments to banks.
A second important indicator is consumer welfare, for which we
use the total consumer expenditure as a proxy. For both indicators
we use a social discount rate of 3% in order to discount future costs
and expenditures to current costs.
Differences in total generation costs between the scenarios are
relatively small. The average (of the Monte-Carlo runs) of the
overall discounted total generation costs in the current scenario,
PureETS, over the entire 39-year simulation period, is 3874 billion
EUR. The MinGB case is on average 0.2% more expensive and
the policy options of MinCWE, BothMin and BMinMax have on
average 0.39%, 0.50% and 0.58% lower total generation costs than
the PureETS. Although these differences are statistically signiﬁ-
cant18 and can be explained by dynamically inefﬁcient invest-
ments (early coal investments that are not used under high CO2
prices), they are so small that consequently a policy choice should
be made on other factors, such as social acceptability, costs to
consumers or acceptability to risk averse investors.
The differences in consumer expenditures (for electricity) are
more signiﬁcant. Fig. 8 shows the speciﬁc discounted consumer
costs (including renewable subsidies, which cause the higher cost
in CWE due to the exogenous renewable scenario) over the
simulation period. National carbon price ﬂoors lower the electri-
city prices in the other zone because they depress CO2 permit
prices. The effect of carbon price ﬂoors on the introducing zone
differs between the MinGB and the MinCWE cases. In the MinCWE
case, average electricity prices are lower and vary less around the
median. This is due to the relatively low price ﬂoor, which does not
push up the electricity price signiﬁcantly but does reduce carbon
price volatility. In GB, on the other hand, the national price ﬂoor is
so high that it increases the cost of electricity to consumers,
yet its impact on the entire system is not large enough to reduce
carbon price volatility signiﬁcantly. Both scenarios with a common
reserve price reduce the cost of electricity to consumers further
and also reduce the spread between the possible outcomes. The
reduction in the cost of electricity to consumers is mainly due to
the lower CO2 prices and thus to a reduction in company proﬁts
and government income. A small share of around 10% is due to
improvements in overall system efﬁciency.
On a yearly basis, differences in electricity prices are much
more pronounced, as can be seen in Fig. 9. While the average price
differences appear socially acceptable, in single years price differ-
ences can be much larger between PureETS and the reserve price
scenarios (BothMin and BMinMax). In 25% of the cases, these
price differences are €50/MWh or higher. Only the scenario with a
price ceiling protects against the risk that high prices occur.
In practice, there are factors that dampen CO2 prices, such as
abatement opportunities in other ETS sectors. Moreover, if very
high prices occurred, political intervention would likely take
place, e.g. in the form of a temporary relaxation of the emissions
cap. Therefore the high prices in the model should not be taken
literally; instead, they indicate the risk that the carbon market
does not induce abatement fast enough which could lead to
economic and political tension. The presence of minimum and
maximum prices removes this risk, while the abatement target is
still achieved.
3.5. Sensitivity analysis: fuel and renewable energy scenarios
In the previous sections, the results for the base case scenarios
were presented. Now we will discuss how different fuel and
renewable energy scenarios affect the simulation outcomes. We
chose these two parameters because of their high impact on
decarbonisation: renewable energy directly affects CO2 emissions
and fuel prices and their relative difference affect decarbonisation
costs. Differences in the renewable and fuel price scenarios have a
signiﬁcant effect upon CO2 prices, but the model results mainly
remain robust with respect to the fundamental nature of the
differences between the CO2 policy options.
The lower the renewable target in the simulation, the higher
are the average CO2 prices and the longer are the CO2 price peaks.
Especially in scenarios without renewable subsidies, model sce-
narios frequently show high prices (cf. Fig. C1). This is reasonable,
since renewables displace conventional generation and its emis-
sions. Total generation costs and consumer payments are signiﬁ-
cantly affected by renewable energy policy: the scenarios without
renewable policy support consistently have around 40% lower
total generation costs than the scenarios with a full renewable
roll-out. This result is due to the high share of solar photovoltaic in
the renewable scenarios and to the assumptions about renewable
technology cost development.19 With less renewable policy sup-
port, the consumer expenditure differences between the policy
options become larger, since MinCWE, BothMin and especially
BMinMax lower the frequency of scarcity prices for CO2 (cf. Figs. C3
and C4). An interesting ﬁnding is that CO2 price and consumer
expenditure volatility increases more in the MinGB case when
renewable subsidies are reduced, than in the other scenarios, up to
the point that costs increase for consumers in CWE as compared to
the PureETS case. A similar result is obtained for runs without CO2
permit banking. Thus in absence of CO2 price dampening factors,20
and assuming short-sighted investors, a national CO2 price ﬂoor in
Table 4
Price ﬂoor levels.
Price Floor Start value [€] Slope [€/year]
Very low 5 0.75
Low 7.5 1.00
Low slope 10 1.50
High 18.5 2.30
18 Kruskal–Wallis and pairwise Wilcox tests show that the MinGB, PureETS and
MinCWE scenarios are signiﬁcantly different from each other and from BothMin
and BMinMax scenarios. Between the BothMin and BMinMax scenarios we did not
ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant difference.
19 A sensitivity analysis regarding these two parameters is out of the scope of
this paper because we focus on CO2 policy.
20 Such as renewable subsidies, CO2 banking by energy producers and spec-
ulators, abatement by other ETS sectors, as well as price elasticity on the
demand sight.
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small parts of the system might increase CO2 price volatility. In
practice, however, it is doubtful whether a sufﬁcient high level of
CO2 price volatility that induces strong abatement swings would
occur under existing dampening factors.
The sensitivity of the results to the fuel price does not provide
unexpected results: higher coal and gas prices lead to higher CO2
prices (since the CO2 price is often determined by the gas/coal
price spread which rises in absolute terms) and longer periods
with scarcity prices for CO2. However, the higher the fuel prices,
the higher are the total generation costs and the consumer
expenditures. The order between the policy options is robust over
the different fuel price scenarios (cf. Figs. D2 and D3), but the
differences between the policy options decrease with lower fuel
prices, due to the decrease of CO2 scarcity prices and the effect of
MinCWE, BothMin and especially BMinMax on dampening them.
3.6. Sensitivity analysis: the level of the price ﬂoor
Another important assumption concerns the level of the price
ﬂoor. We tested the sensitivity to this assumption by varying the
price ﬂoor level compared to the base scenario:
The high scenario (cf. Table 4) is the closest to the actual
minimum price ﬂoor introduced in GB (and used in the MinGB
base case scenario), and we see it as an upper bound to a European
compromise on a common price ﬂoor. The very low ﬂoor scenario
on the other hand presents a lower bound, with a starting level
close to 2013 prices. Together the discussed ﬂoor prices cover a
broad range of dynamic results, as can be seen in Fig. E1.
Not surprisingly, the higher the price ﬂoor and the bigger the
introducing zone, the stronger are the effects on the CO2 permit
price, as was also discussed in Section 3.2. The effects of different
price ﬂoors on CO2 permit prices are shown in Fig. E1. The higher
the price ﬂoor, the more often it is applied. Already the price ﬂoor
starting at €10/ton and rising by €1.50/ton per year is active in
a majority of years. However, high price ﬂoors cause a policy
overshoot in that carbon emissions may drop below the emissions
cap (cf. Fig. E2). Very high price ﬂoors thus achieve very low
volatility (since they basically act as a tax), however also lead to
higher costs to consumers due to the greater carbon abatement
efforts (cf. Figs. E3 and E4). A lower price ﬂoor in combination with
a price ceiling achieves at least the same level of low volatility at
lower prices for consumers.
3.7. Reﬂection on the assumptions
As with any model, there are several underlying assumptions
and limitations to our analysis, which need to be taken into
account before coming to an evaluation of its results. First of all,
it should be kept in mind that due to the long-term nature and the
many assumptions that are necessary, the results of this model do
not constitute exact market forecasts, but are rather an investiga-
tion of the investment dynamics in the power sector and there
interaction with CO2 policies. We will discuss here the main
assumptions underlying the model (other than the ones that were
discussed in the sensitivity analysis) and how we expect them to
inﬂuence our results.
The investors in our analysis have a rather short-term horizon
for making decisions and only a limited capacity to forecast
demand, and the prices of fuels, CO2 and electricity. If investors
were more clairvoyant, we would expect less pronounced invest-
ment and abatement swings. This would reduce the difference in
overall total generation costs and consumer expenditures (due to a
lower occurrence of price peaks) between the policy options.
However, investment decisions leading to over capacity and
as well as erroneous CO2 price forecasts have been observed in
Europe, giving support to our assumptions.
The scope of the model is limited to the electricity sectors of
Great Britain and Central-Western Europe, with a ﬁxed intercon-
nection capacity. Electricity demand is assumed to be price-
inelastic and banking of CO2 permits is only done by power
producers for the next three years. These assumptions have
as a consequence that the model may exaggerate CO2 price
swings, because some inter-temporal and inter-sectoral ﬂexibility
is ignored. A larger system, like the EU-ETS, would dampen price
swings. As a result, in practice we would expect the differences in
consumer expenditures between the policy options to be smaller,
since they are driven by price peaks. A larger interconnection
capacity between zones will negatively impact the dispatch of
generators in periods in the zone where a national price ﬂoor is
active. For this reason we see the introduction of national carbon
price ﬂoors in well-interconnected electricity systems as politically
unviable. This view is supported by the fact that Great Britain
excluded Northern Ireland from their price ﬂoor, since it is well
connected to Ireland (UK Government HM Revenue & Customs,
2013).
4. Conclusions and policy implications
We present an agent-based model of investment by proﬁt-
oriented electricity generation companies in two interconnected
electricity markets (based on Great Britain and Central Western
Europe) and including an endogenous CO2 market with banking.
In this setting, we analysed ﬁve different CO2 policy options with
national and pan-national price ﬂoors, as well as a price ceiling,
under the stochastic input parameters of electricity demand and
fuel prices.
We found that in an unaltered EU ETS, or one with a minimum
price ﬂoor in Great Britain, there is a signiﬁcant chance of CO2
price shocks and CO2 price volatility, which may lead to socially
in-acceptable electricity prices in single years. In comparison a
common, moderate CO2 auction reserve price of 7:50€=tonCO2 ,
increasing by 1€=tonCO2 per year, results in a more continuous
decarbonisation pathway. This reduces CO2 price volatility and the
occurrence of carbon scarcity price periods and electricity price
shocks. It also reduces the spread of possible consumer expendi-
tures. A price ﬂoor that is set too high causes inefﬁciencies, but
also reduces emissions to a level signiﬁcantly below the cap. An
additional, moderate price ceiling of 60€=tonCO2 , increasing by
2€=tonCO2 per year, would effectively shield consumers from the
remaining risk of price shocks. Importantly, these price restrictions
were not found to cause a large risk: no overall emission over-
shoots in the long run nor large long-lasting temporal overshoots
occur. The volatility of CO2 prices is lower in scenarios with larger
volumes of subsidised renewable energy and with a lower abso-
lute coal to gas price spread.
A national price ﬂoor, like in the GB, leads to a faster
decarbonisation in the introducing country and lowers the cost
to consumers in the other zone; the larger the price ﬂoor, the
stronger the effect. Especially a price ﬂoor in the larger zone lets
the consumers in the small zone free ride on signiﬁcantly lower
electricity prices. National price ﬂoors do not lead to signiﬁcantly
less emissions overall; even a small zone can cancel out the over-
abatement induced by the national price ﬂoor in a large part of
the ETS.
Our work is complementary to the previous work by Burtraw
et al. (2010) and Wood and Jotzo (2011). In contrast to Burtraw
et al. (2010) we simulate agents with less perfect foresight
and we discuss both common and national price ﬂoors. In com-
parison our ﬁndings highlight the risk of consumer price shocks
due to non-continuous decarbonisation pathways. Wood and
Jotzo (2011) analyse a great variety of price ﬂoors and caps
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theoretically. We investigate some of these in a simulation model
and conﬁrm their hypothesis regarding the reduction of CO2
price, and that national price ﬂoors will commensurately reduce
effort elsewhere.
We recommend to introduce a moderate price ﬂoor and price
ceiling when designing or improving emission trading systems.
This lowers the cost of abatement by reducing policy uncertainty
for investors and shields consumers and industry from carbon
price peaks. While other policy methods, such as backloading,
exist, price caps provide better predictability (see also Fankhauser
and Hepburn, 2010), since politically unsustainable price levels
(both on the upper and lower end) are prevented and implicit
price caps are made explicit. A national price ﬂoor is necessarily
implemented as a supplementary tax, but if it is expanded into
a system-wide price-ﬂoor we recommend shifting to a reserve
price in the allowance auction to prevent banking of high volumes
of emission allowances.
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Appendix A. Technologies
See Table A1. Used acronyms: steam cycle (SC), pulverised
steam cycle (PSC), integrated gasiﬁcation combined cycle (IGCC),
open cycle gas turbine (OCGT), combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT)
and carbon capture and storage (CCS).
Appendix B. Gas and coal price model
As introduced in Section 2.6, coal and gas prices in the
simulation are modelled as mean reverting stochastic processes
following trend lines (cf. Fig. B1). For this the Ornstein–Uhlenbeck
process have been used, where μt are the log trend value in each
time step, X the log fuel price vector of gas and coal prices, dWt
two correlated Wiener process, and r the volatility vector and λ
Table A1
Power generation technology assumptions.
Generation
technology
Capacity κp
[MW]
Construction
time tb [a]
Permit
time
tPe [a]
Technical
lifetime
[a]
Depreciation
time tD [a]
CO2
capture
eff. [%]
Min.
Running
hours rh [h]
Base
Availability
a20;p
Peak
Availability
a1;p
Fuels
(max. %)
Nuclear 1000 7 2 40 25 n.a. 5000 1 1 Uranium
Coal Pulverised SC 758 4 1 50 20 0 5000 1 1 Coal, Biomass
(10%)
Lignite 1000 5 1 50 20 0 5000 1 1 Lignite
CoalPSC with CCS 600 4 1 50 20 87.5 5000 1 1 Coal, Biomass
(10%)
IGCC 758 4 1 50 20 0 0 1 1 Coal, Biomass
(10%)
IGCC with CSS 600 4 1 50 20 87.5 0 1 1 Coal, Biomass
(10%)
Biomass
combustion
500 3 1 40 15 0 5000 1 1 Biomass
Biogas 500 3 1 40 15 0 0 1 1 Biomass
CCGT 776 2 1 40 15 0 0 1 1 Gas
CCGT with CCS 600 3 1 40 15 85 0 1 1 Gas
OCGT 150 0.5 0.5 30 15 0 0 1 1 Gas
Hydropower 1000 5 2 100 30 n.a. 0 0 0.60 n.a.
Wind 600 1 1 25 15 n.a. 0 0.40 0.05 n.a.
Wind offshore 600 2 1 25 15 n.a. 0 0.60 0.07 n.a.
Photovoltaic 100 2 1 25 15 n.a. 0 0.20 0.04 n.a.
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Fig. B1. Fuel price trends for coal and gas.
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the speed of mean reversion:
dX¼ λðμtXÞþrdWt ðB:1Þ
The Wiener processes dWt were obtained using the Cholesky
decomposition of the correlation of log fuel price returns. The
mean reversion speed is set to 1/5 (approximately 5 years of mean
reversion), which is in line with an estimation made by Pindyck
(1999), which, however, could not be substantiated by root
unit tests, since these need an even longer period to be applied.
The implementation for discrete time steps was done using the
exact approach by Gillespie (1996).
Appendix C. Sensitivity analysis: renewable subsidies
See Figs. C1–C3. The renewable scenarios are shortened to FRES
(Full RES), HRES (Half RES) and ZRES (Zero RES).
Appendix D. Sensitivity analysis: fuel prices
The fuel price scenarios are simply named medium, high and
low in the different ﬁgures. The expenditure boxplots (Figs. D2 and
D3) show total consumer expenditures, including renewable
subsidies.
Fig. C1. CO2 price development for RES sensitivity.
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Fig. C3. Boxplots of consumer expenditures in CWE in different RES scenarios.
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Fig. C2. Histograms of CO2 emissions for RES sensitivity.
J.C. Richstein et al. / Energy Policy 71 (2014) 139–158152
●●●●
●● ●
●
●
●●
●
●
●●
●
●
●●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
FRES HRES ZRES
25
50
75
100
125
150
PureETS
MinGB
MinCWE
BothMin
BMinMax
PureETS
MinGB
MinCWE
BothMin
BMinMax
PureETS
MinGB
MinCWE
BothMin
BMinMax
Scenario
To
ta
l D
is
c.
 C
on
su
m
er
 C
os
t [
EU
R
/M
W
h]
Fig. C4. Boxplots of consumer expenditures in GB in different RES scenarios.
Fig. D1. Histograms of CO2 emissions for fuel price sensitivity.
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Fig. D2. Boxplots of speciﬁc total consumer expenditures in CWE in different fuel price trend scenarios.
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Fig. D3. Boxplots of speciﬁc total consumer expenditures in GB in different fuel price trend scenarios.
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Fig. E1. The impact of different price ﬂoor and caps on CO2 prices. The levels of the price ﬂoors are indicated to the right of the graphs.
Appendix E. Sensitivity: ﬂoor price level
See Figs. E1, E2, E3 and E4 and Table E1.
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Fig. E2. The impact of different price ﬂoor and caps on CO2 emissions. The levels of the price ﬂoors are indicated to the right of the graphs.
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Fig. E3. The impact of different price ﬂoor and caps on total cost to consumers in CWE.
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Fig. E4. The impact of different price ﬂoor and caps on total cost to consumers in GB.
Table E1
Total generation costs regarding price ﬂoors [EUR].
CO2 Policy Price ﬂoor 0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
MinGB 5 EUR þ 0.75 EUR/year 3.51eþ12 3.79eþ12 3.86eþ12 3.97eþ12 4.31eþ12
MinGB 7.5 EUR þ 1 EURyear 3.49eþ12 3.78eþ12 3.85eþ12 3.96eþ12 4.32eþ12
MinGB 10 EUR þ 1.5 EUR/year 3.49eþ12 3.78eþ12 3.85eþ12 3.96eþ12 4.33eþ12
MinGB 10 EUR þ 2 EUR/year 3.48eþ12 3.78eþ12 3.86eþ12 3.96eþ12 4.33eþ12
MinGB 18.5 EUR þ 2.3 EUR/year 3.49eþ12 3.79eþ12 3.85eþ12 3.99eþ12 4.34eþ12
MinCWE 5 EUR þ 0.75 EUR/year 3.47eþ12 3.77eþ12 3.84eþ12 3.96eþ12 4.32eþ12
MinCWE 7.5 EUR þ 1 EURyear 3.46eþ12 3.76eþ12 3.83eþ12 3.95eþ12 4.31eþ12
MinCWE 10 EUR þ 1.5 EUR/year 3.45eþ12 3.75eþ12 3.83eþ12 3.94eþ12 4.32eþ12
MinCWE 10 EUR þ 2 EUR/year 3.47eþ12 3.76eþ12 3.84eþ12 3.95eþ12 4.32eþ12
MinCWE 18.5 EUR þ 2.3 EUR/year 3.51eþ12 3.78eþ12 3.86eþ12 3.96eþ12 4.34eþ12
BothMin 5 EUR þ 0.75 EUR/year 3.45eþ12 3.77eþ12 3.84eþ12 3.96eþ12 4.32eþ12
BothMin 7.5 EUR þ 1 EURyear 3.46eþ12 3.75eþ12 3.83eþ12 3.95eþ12 4.30eþ12
BothMin 10 EUR þ 1.5 EUR/year 3.47eþ12 3.77eþ12 3.84eþ12 3.95eþ12 4.31eþ12
BothMin 10 EUR þ 2 EUR/year 3.51eþ12 3.80eþ12 3.86eþ12 3.97eþ12 4.34eþ12
BothMin 18.5 EUR þ 2.3 EUR/year 3.55eþ12 3.83eþ12 3.91eþ12 4.01eþ12 4.37eþ12
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Appendix F. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found in
the online version at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2014.03.037.
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Table E1 (continued )
CO2 Policy Price ﬂoor 0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
BMinMax 5 EUR þ 0.75 EUR/year 3.45eþ12 3.77eþ12 3.84eþ12 3.96eþ12 4.31eþ12
BMinMax 7.5 EUR þ 1 EURyear 3.46eþ12 3.75eþ12 3.83eþ12 3.95eþ12 4.31eþ12
BMinMax 10 EUR þ 1.5 EUR/year 3.47eþ12 3.76eþ12 3.84eþ12 3.95eþ12 4.32eþ12
BMinMax 10 EUR þ 2 EUR/year 3.50eþ12 3.80eþ12 3.86eþ12 3.97eþ12 4.34eþ12
BMinMax 18.5 EUR þ 2.3 EUR/year 3.55eþ12 3.83eþ12 3.91eþ12 4.00eþ12 4.36eþ12
J.C. Richstein et al. / Energy Policy 71 (2014) 139–158158
